Difference between revisions of "Trust Label"
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*[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9169/14180/bitcoin%20a%20peertopeer%20electonic%20cast%20system%20satoshi%20nakamoto.pdf bitcoin a peertopeer electonic cast system satoshi nakamoto] | *[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9169/14180/bitcoin%20a%20peertopeer%20electonic%20cast%20system%20satoshi%20nakamoto.pdf bitcoin a peertopeer electonic cast system satoshi nakamoto] | ||
*[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9176/14188/Can%20Trust-Based%20Private%20Blockchains%20Be%20Trusted%20-%20CoinDesk.htm Can Trust-Based Private Blockchains Be Trusted?] | *[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9176/14188/Can%20Trust-Based%20Private%20Blockchains%20Be%20Trusted%20-%20CoinDesk.htm Can Trust-Based Private Blockchains Be Trusted?] | ||
| − | ''Proof-of-work 'paradigm shift' | + | '''''Proof-of-work 'paradigm shift'''' |
Let us digress for a moment to a prior argument in order to elucidate the immense paradigm shift that proof-of-work delivers in the form of a trustless environment. | Let us digress for a moment to a prior argument in order to elucidate the immense paradigm shift that proof-of-work delivers in the form of a trustless environment. | ||
| + | |||
Many would argue that cheating by, or collusion amongst, regulated parties is an illegal act with associated and significant deterrent costs which are sufficient to enforce the rules. | Many would argue that cheating by, or collusion amongst, regulated parties is an illegal act with associated and significant deterrent costs which are sufficient to enforce the rules. | ||
| + | |||
As evidenced above, we know this line of reasoning to be faulty. | As evidenced above, we know this line of reasoning to be faulty. | ||
| + | |||
The reason for this is because when practicably employed, traditional deterrents generate both a non-deterministic and dynamic environment whereby deterrent costs inevitably become cost/benefit estimations – that is, zero cost for successful evasions versus more money due at some future point in time for unsuccessful cheating. | The reason for this is because when practicably employed, traditional deterrents generate both a non-deterministic and dynamic environment whereby deterrent costs inevitably become cost/benefit estimations – that is, zero cost for successful evasions versus more money due at some future point in time for unsuccessful cheating. | ||
| + | |||
Contrary to the traditional deterrents approach, proof-of-work is entirely deterministic, whereby parties know the cost of cheating and collusion and must decide to pay this cost upfront. | Contrary to the traditional deterrents approach, proof-of-work is entirely deterministic, whereby parties know the cost of cheating and collusion and must decide to pay this cost upfront. | ||
| + | |||
If efficiency is greatest when the countermeasures are most expensive and immediate, then proof-of-work in the context of a distributed ledger and the trustless environment it helps to generate is a massive paradigm shift that is foundationally new and revolutionary. | If efficiency is greatest when the countermeasures are most expensive and immediate, then proof-of-work in the context of a distributed ledger and the trustless environment it helps to generate is a massive paradigm shift that is foundationally new and revolutionary. | ||
| + | |||
It should be apparent by now that trust-based systems are merely unsecure and non-empirical software 'workarounds' (if you can even call them that) to the provision of a real security work-product, proof-of- work. In addition, it should be equally apparent that the arguments in support of workarounds to proof-of-work arise, not from a wisdom that it is prudent to build a distributed ledger without proof-of-work, but rather they arise solely from the historical inability to attain proof-of-work in an economical way. | It should be apparent by now that trust-based systems are merely unsecure and non-empirical software 'workarounds' (if you can even call them that) to the provision of a real security work-product, proof-of- work. In addition, it should be equally apparent that the arguments in support of workarounds to proof-of-work arise, not from a wisdom that it is prudent to build a distributed ledger without proof-of-work, but rather they arise solely from the historical inability to attain proof-of-work in an economical way. | ||
| + | |||
It should also be obvious from the discussion that the proof-of-work protocol is factually the underlying key to unlocking the huge paradigm shift and efficiency of distributed-ledger blockchain technology – no traditional deterrents and countermeasures required – there really is no other viable alternative. | It should also be obvious from the discussion that the proof-of-work protocol is factually the underlying key to unlocking the huge paradigm shift and efficiency of distributed-ledger blockchain technology – no traditional deterrents and countermeasures required – there really is no other viable alternative. | ||
Incorporating the proof-of-work protocol into private blockchain technology taps directly into the immense efficiency of the bitcoin blockchain paradigm shift. Without it, all you've built is an old-fashioned (and inefficient) distributed database.'' | Incorporating the proof-of-work protocol into private blockchain technology taps directly into the immense efficiency of the bitcoin blockchain paradigm shift. Without it, all you've built is an old-fashioned (and inefficient) distributed database.'' | ||
| − | + | *[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9179/14191/CommonAccord_Provenance_blockchain.pdf CommonAccord Provenance Blockchain] | |
| − | *[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9179/14191/CommonAccord_Provenance_blockchain.pdf CommonAccord Provenance Blockchain] | ||
*[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9186/14198/IBM%20Internet%20of%20things%20block%20chain.pdf IBM Internet of things block chain] | *[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9186/14198/IBM%20Internet%20of%20things%20block%20chain.pdf IBM Internet of things block chain] | ||
*[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9175/14187/Linux%20Foundation%20Unites%20Industry%20Leaders%20to%20Advance%20Blockchain%20Technology.htm Linux Foundation Unites Industry Leaders to Advance Blockchain Technology] | *[http://gforge.hl7.org/gf/download/docmanfileversion/9175/14187/Linux%20Foundation%20Unites%20Industry%20Leaders%20to%20Advance%20Blockchain%20Technology.htm Linux Foundation Unites Industry Leaders to Advance Blockchain Technology] | ||
Revision as of 17:06, 3 May 2016
Contents
Trust Label Purpose
Trust codes are required to meet stakeholder use case for a discoverable and computable set of metadata to convey asserted trust attributes of an exchange partner.
Trust Library
Block Chaining
- bitcoin a peertopeer electonic cast system satoshi nakamoto
- Can Trust-Based Private Blockchains Be Trusted?
Proof-of-work 'paradigm shift' Let us digress for a moment to a prior argument in order to elucidate the immense paradigm shift that proof-of-work delivers in the form of a trustless environment.
Many would argue that cheating by, or collusion amongst, regulated parties is an illegal act with associated and significant deterrent costs which are sufficient to enforce the rules.
As evidenced above, we know this line of reasoning to be faulty.
The reason for this is because when practicably employed, traditional deterrents generate both a non-deterministic and dynamic environment whereby deterrent costs inevitably become cost/benefit estimations – that is, zero cost for successful evasions versus more money due at some future point in time for unsuccessful cheating.
Contrary to the traditional deterrents approach, proof-of-work is entirely deterministic, whereby parties know the cost of cheating and collusion and must decide to pay this cost upfront.
If efficiency is greatest when the countermeasures are most expensive and immediate, then proof-of-work in the context of a distributed ledger and the trustless environment it helps to generate is a massive paradigm shift that is foundationally new and revolutionary.
It should be apparent by now that trust-based systems are merely unsecure and non-empirical software 'workarounds' (if you can even call them that) to the provision of a real security work-product, proof-of- work. In addition, it should be equally apparent that the arguments in support of workarounds to proof-of-work arise, not from a wisdom that it is prudent to build a distributed ledger without proof-of-work, but rather they arise solely from the historical inability to attain proof-of-work in an economical way.
It should also be obvious from the discussion that the proof-of-work protocol is factually the underlying key to unlocking the huge paradigm shift and efficiency of distributed-ledger blockchain technology – no traditional deterrents and countermeasures required – there really is no other viable alternative. Incorporating the proof-of-work protocol into private blockchain technology taps directly into the immense efficiency of the bitcoin blockchain paradigm shift. Without it, all you've built is an old-fashioned (and inefficient) distributed database.
*CommonAccord Provenance Blockchain
- IBM Internet of things block chain
- Linux Foundation Unites Industry Leaders to Advance Blockchain Technology
- On Public and Private Blockchains - Ethereum Blog
- The Blockchain and the Rise of Networked Trust
DirectTrust
- DirectTrust HIT Coordinator David Kibbe Slides
- DirectTrust Overview
- DTAAP Accreditation 031314 final
Federal Trust Bundle
GTRI - IDESG
- GTRI Trustmark
- IDESG TFTM Brief
- TFTM-high-level-discussion
- IDESG_PPT_TFTM
- IDESG Trust Framework Baseline Functional Requirements - Final_07_17_2015
- TFTM_Conformance_Program
- IDESG_Conformance_Attestation_Program_v0.5
- TFTM_Self-Assement_Listing_Service_User_Guide_V.9_-_Final_Draft
- IDESG Self Assessment Listing Instructions
